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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YElL\ T. CALLISTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LFCY C. C.ALLISTER, Individually 
and as Executrix of the Estate of 
1\lfred Cyril Callister, Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
\ 
Case No. 
10013 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEl· 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent has simplified the fraud issue by con-
ceding (Respondent's Brief, p. 9) that ordinary liti-
gants have no duty voluntarily to disclose facts helpful 
to the opposition; but has raised a new issue by calling 
her action "fraud" while arguing about it as if she were 
the beneficiary of some new kind of judicial and admin-
istratiYe estoppel. 
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To accomplish her purpose sh~ has paraphrased 
wh~t Lucy said and did to the detriment of Lucy's 
pos,ition. As a result, the "simple" statement of facts 
in respondent's brief tends to mislead. On page I, for 
example, she states that Dr. Callister made gifts to 
Lucy ~~telling her that the transfers were made for the 
purpose of removing the stocks from his name and 
placing them beyond the access of Vera," from which 
an unwary reader would conclude that the telling was 
done when the transfers were made, whereas the appel-
lant had offered to show that Dr. Callister's statement 
was made sometime after he had taken the steps to 
transfer the stocks. 
Vera keeps saying that Lucy swore to the Tax 
Commission that the transfers of stock were made for 
the purpose of defrauding Vera when, as a matter of 
fact, the affidavit said no such thing. The only statement 
in the affidavit attributable to Dr. Callister was that 
"The transfers were made for the purpose of 
removing the stocks from his name and placing 
them beyond access of his former wife, Vera 
Callister." 1 
The evidence would show that Vera Callister remained 
close to some, if not all, of her and Dr. Callister's chil-
dren. It is legitimate to suppose that Dr. Callister sought 
to prevent such "access" to the property as 'Tera might 
IThis is harmonious with what Lucy said in her deposition (R. 
59:15): " * * * my husband thought it was best to put them in my 
name." At that time counsel failed to ask why, notwithstanding 
the question would seem to be the logical next step in inquiring 
about claimed fraudulent transfers. 
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have had through her children -his statutory heirs. It 
is nlso legitimate to suppose that he was trying to pre-
,·ent oppressive or harrassing lifetime conduct by 
\~era - another kind of "access" - since Vera knew 
the stocks were important to him. 
There's no denying that the affidavits were made 
in connection with negotiations about the inclusion of 
the transferred property in Dr. Callister's estate for tax 
purposes, but contrary to what Vera would have one 
believe, the commission had been informed fully about 
Vera's action against Lucy, the defenses to it, and its 
settlement. It had to take a stand with respect to the late 
Dr. Callister's intent, and the affidavits contain some 
(but not much) evidence of that intent. The Tax Com-
mission made its own investigation and decided to settle 
for less than the full amount claimed. That's what Vera 
had done previously. 
Respondent's treatment of the precedents resembles 
her treatment of the facts. Cases cited on page 7 of 
respondent's brief, in support of the proposition that 
Dr. Callister's statement would be admissible against 
Lucy, all concerned delivery of deeds and aren't perti-
nent to the question presented. 
At page 8 of her brief respondent says that com-
munications between husband and wife while they are 
engaged in perpetration of a fraud are admissible-and 
son1e courts so hold. But Vera hasn't introduced any 
evidence -let alone proved - that Dr. Callister's state-
ment was made while the parties were so engaged. 
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In discussing In re Blodgetf's Estate~ 93 Utah I, 
70 P .2d 7 42, 7 49, on page 20 of her brief, respondent 
makes much of the fact that an administrator has "the 
duty to make full disclosure of all matters and infor-
mation regarding the estate," but gives an unwar-
rantedly narrow interpretation to the following: 
"But [Crosby] being the superior party in such 
case does not mean that he is under obligation 
to advise his partner in matters affecting a con-
flict of interests between themselves." 
Counsel assumes that "advise" means "to give 
adyice to; to recommend (a course of action) to; to 
counsel; warn" - one meaning in a standard desk dic-
tionary; but does not mean "to give information or 
notice to; to apprise; inform" - another definition of 
the same dictionary.2 The latter definition is the one 
that has some relation to the facts being considered by 
the court in Blodgett. 
The other cases relied upon to support ·vera's claim 
that Lucy had a duty to disclose evidence to her do not 
support the proposition. None of them involves similar 
facts; and none has placed upon a fiduciary a duty to 
make the kind of disclosure sought by Vera. Their main 
purpose seems to be to add moral tone to the brief 
through repetition of high-sounding, solemn exhorta-
tions about duty, trust and honor. 'V e, too, believe fidu-
ciaries ought to do what they are supposed to do, but 
we believe that the scope of the duty must be found in 
2Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1961 Ed.). 
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the law -- including decided cases - not in counsel's 
ipse di.l'it. 
Treatment of other cases by respondent was also 
loose. g IIUIIOWi t'. BartonJ 109 Cal. 662, 42 Pac. 303, is 
characterized as being decided upon the basis of an 1849 
statute on husband-wife privilege and as being no longer 
the law. The case did refer to §1849 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure; but the husband-wife privilege was found in 
§1881. the same as 78-24-8 (I) Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Kelly v. Bank of America Nat. Trust~ Savings 
.Assn., 112 Cal. App. 2d 388, 246 P.2d 92, wasn't con-
cerned with the husband-wife privilege; and the privi-
lege holding of Emmons was expressly approved In 
Tanzola v. De RitaJ 45 Cal. 2d 1, 285 P.2d 897. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOP-
PEL HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS 
CASE. 
It is apparent from respondent's brief that her 
sense of outrage was spawned in Lucy's "inconsistent 
positions" - taken in defending inconsistent claims 
against her by , ... era and the Tax Commission. 
The cases recognize that the taking of inconsistent 
positions is sometimes justifiable and that, in any event, 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not automatically 
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establish the truth of one or the other of the positions 
advanced. y· era's position seems to be that because Lucy 
"misbehaved" Vera should win, without regard to the 
merits of the action for rescission or long-recognized 
essential elements of fraud. 
Tracy Loan and Trust Company v. Openshaw In-
vestment Company et al.~ 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 
was an action by an administrator to determine owner-
ship of stock, the defendants being the investment com-
pany and all decedent's heirs. The administrator and 
C. R. Openshaw both claimed beneficial ownership of 
638 shares of stock, but in an earlier divorce proceeding 
C. R. Openshaw had denied under oath that he was the 
owner of anything in the corporation except 50 shares 
of stock. In ruling upon a contention of the appellant 
that C. R. Openshaw was estopped to take inconsistent 
positions in the two actions, this court said: 
"The testimony of Clarence R. Openshaw in 
the divorce proceedings was almost diametrically 
opposed to his verified pleadings and testimony 
in the present case. * * * His testimony was 
positive in both cases. In fact, the testimony in-
dicates that he made his statements as to the 
purported facts carefully and deliberately. Coun-
sel for appellant contends that inasmuch as he 
knew all the facts all the time he either perjured 
himself in the divorce action or in this case; and 
that the law does not permit a litigant to play 
fast and loose with the court so as to give testi-
mony to suit his own purposes in one action 
and then in a later action be per1nitted to con-
tradict his testimony because it is advantageous 
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for him to do so. Appellant contends that the 
rule of 'judicial estoppel' applies to bar Clarence 
R. Openshaw from asserting ownership of the 
638 shares of stock issued to his father's trustee, 
for the reason his prior testimony amounts to a 
sworn declaration that he had no stock nor any 
interest in any stock except the 50 shares which 
he swore in lU:J:.? he then no longer owned.***" 
A.fter stating that the rule should be invoked only 
where prior and subsequent litigation involved the same 
parties, and where one party had relied on the former 
testimony and changed his position, the court pointed 
out that the party invoking the rule must show that he 
has done something or omitted to do something in reli-
ance upon the conduct of the other parties, by reason 
of which he will be prejudiced if the facts are shown 
to be different from those on which he relied. 
"The general rule is that testimony given by a 
witness in a prior action, except where the parties 
are the same and there is reliance to the prejudice 
of the party invoking the rule of estoppel, such 
testimony in the prior action merely constitutes 
eYidence which may be employed to impeach the 
witness or to contradict his inconsistent testimony 
in the subsequent action. * * * 
"If a witness commits perjury, even though 
the statute of limitations bars prosecution for 
such offense by reason of lapse of time, a person 
who testified falsely can be reached by contempt 
proceedings, which may in many instances have 
a more salutary effect than preventing a witness 
from finally telling the truth." 
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In Parkinson 'V. The California Company, 10 Cir., 
233 F.2d 432, the parties sought to invoke the rule of 
judicial estoppel on the ground that a petition filed in 
a state court, being under oath, estopped plaintiff from 
questioning facts asserted in the petition, and that those 
facts conclusively showed an independent intervening 
cause of plaintiff's damage. The court said: 
"True it is that a 'judicial estoppel' of the 
nature contended for by defendants has been 
recognized. * * * This reflects the minority view-
point which has encountered inhospitable recep-
tion outside the State of Tennessee. The Su-
preme Court of Wyomnig has observed that 'the 
Tennessee courts probably go too far' and has 
indicated that a position taken by a man in one 
proceeding ordinarily is merely evidence and can-
not work an absolute estoppel in another, and 
that only in cases such as the one it then had be-
fore it, where the man was successful in the 
position taken in the first proceeding would such 
evidence rise to the dignity of conclusiveness in 
another. * * * Moreover, in its most rigid appli-
cation, the Tennessee rule seems not to apply to 
statements of law or opinion, statements made 
through mistake or otherwise not knowingly 
false, nor to pleadings not in fact inconsistent or 
contradictory. 
"It is doubtful that the two pleadings under 
consideration here are actually inconsistent. One 
seems merely to omit certain facts set out in the 
other. Be that as it may, we must reject the 
theory that the pleadings of the claim under oath, 
apart from equitable considerations which may 
be deemed in reason to operate as an estoppel by 
conduct, irrevocably freezes the contentions of 
10 
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the pleader so that under no circumstances may 
he alter his view in that, or another, case, or assert 
an ineonsistent position. This would not be in 
keeping with the spirit of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 8(e) (2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
would be out of harmony with the great weight 
of authority independent of that rule, and would 
discourage the determination of cases on the basis 
of the true t'acts as they might be established 
ultimately. Even in the case of false statements 
in pleadings, public policy can be vindicated 
otherwise- and more practicably and fairly in 
most instances - than through suppression of 
truth in the future." 
Y era would go further than the much-criticized 
Tennessee rule. She would not require an actual incon-
sistency, nor success in the first action. She would have 
this court hold as a matter of law that the mere sub-
mission of evidence in a case involving somewhat incon-
sistent theories would entitle Vera to annulment of the 
previous judgment, release and payment, and a second 
chance to win her case- or to obtain a higher figure for 
settlement (and perhaps a still-higher one for settlement 
of an inchoate third case) . 
'V e submit that no policy nor case law justifies 
setting aside the judgment and release entered into after 
arm's-length negotiations between experienced counsel, 
particularly when there was in fact no reliance by Vera 
upon Lucy having "'confessed all." 
If \r era contends that Lucy and her counsel had a 
duty (enforceable by contempt proceedings) to disclose 
11 
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to Vera all the evidence that might be used against them 
in this case; that denial of statements in pleadings was 
a breach of ethics constituting a fraud on the court by 
her counsel; or that there was any perjury either before 
the trial court or the Tax Commission - she and her 
counsel are invited to test these matters in an appropri-
ate proceeding. But this court should not use Vera's 
arguments and her counsel's bald assertions as a basis 
for establishing a proposition, which if general, would 
discourage reasonable persons from undertaking to act 
as personal representatives, and foreclose those willing 
to act from making reasonable settlements of contested 
matters. 
II 
RULE 60(b) DOES NOT CREATE A 
NEW SUBSTANTIVE GROUND FOR SET-
TING ASIDE JUDGMENTS. 
Respondent argues that there was "fraud upon the 
court" as that term is used in Rule 60 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. But the rule is procedural and 
refers litigants back to the general law to find the 
grounds for setting aside a judgment. Under Rule 
60 (b) the action wasn't timely to reinstate the prior 
action because the "motion" was not filed within three 
months. 
With respect to the claimed "fraud upon the court," 
respondent confuses Lucy's status as an officer of the 
12 
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probate court with her status as a litigant in the civil 
adion .. ..\dtnittedly n personal representative is a kind 
of "officer of the court" in connection with probate 
proceedings, 
"At least in respect of those matters in which 
they act only under direction and subject to the 
approval of the court." 2 Bancroffs Probate 
Practice (2nd Ed.) §337. 
But the case settled by these parties through their coun-
sel was not a probate matter. It was a contested civil 
action in which both parties were represented by counsel 
and in which the primary relief sought by Vera was to 
set aside a conveyance by Dr. Callister and reach Lucy's 
individual assets. 
The questions presented in this appeal cannot be 
resolved by saying that an executrix is an "officer of the 
court," any more than they can be resolved by the trial 
court's platitude that "the law insists that a dead man 
be honest before he is liberal." 
III 
THERE WAS NO RELIANCE JUSTIFY-
IXG .THE TRIAL COURT IN SETTING 
ASIDE THE PRIOR JUDGMENT. 
Yera's conception of "reliance" is immaculately 
simple. She says that if she had known of Dr. Callister's 
statement she wouldn't have settled for the same price . 
. Yoh.~here does she say that she settled in the belief that 
13 
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Lucy had disclosed to her all relevant information about 
Dr. Callister~s affairs. The reliance for which she advo-
cates is not the test, and her employment of an attorney 
made it apparent that she was not relying on Lucy to 
"do right" by her. The entire lawsuit was handled by 
her attorney, and while he contends (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 14) that he "was duped along with Vera," no 
claim has been made that Lucy was a fiduciary to him. 
In addition to Colton v. Stanford~ 82 Cal. 351, 23 
Pac. 16, 16 Am. St. Rep. 137, and Jorgensen v. Jorgen-
sen~ 32 Cal.2d 13, 193 P.2d 728, cited in appellant's ori-
ginal brief, a number of other cases (apparently over-
looked by respondent) have considered the effect of 
independent advice upon the claimed duties of fiduci-
aries. 
Collins v. Collins~ 48 Cal.2d 325, 309 P.2d 420, 
was an action to set aside a husband-wife property settle-
ment agreement on the ground that the husband had 
breached his fiduciary relationship in inducing the wife 
to execute the agreement. Plaintiff had employed an 
attorney and negotiations were conducted by the attor-
ney with the husband. Plaintiff and her attorney had 
begun an investigation of the community property but 
did not pursue it because plaintiff was satisfied with the 
terms of the settlement. Defendant had done nothing 
to preclude plaintiff or her attorney from investigating 
the property, and when the property settlement was 
executed, plaintiff relied on the advice of her counsel. 
The court said: 
14 
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"The situation here is sitnilar also to that in 
Cameron 'l'. Cameron, 88 Cal. App.2d 585, 593-
;)H.>. 199 P.id -tct:3, where a judgment setting 
aside a property settletnent agreement at the 
instance of plaintiff wife was reversed. It was 
there held that '(1} when one undertakes an in-
vestigation (as l\Irs. Cameron did before she 
made the property settlement agreement} and 
proceeds with it without hindrance it will be 
assumed that he continued until he had acquired 
all the know ledge he desired and was satisfied 
with what he learned. He cannot be heard to say 
that he relied on the representations of the other 
party. [citation.} * * * [3] the decision of plain-
tiff's attorneys to accept defendant's proposal 
without a contest, although now claimed to have 
been ill advised and unfair to her was her decision 
and she is bound thereby." 
Recognizing the fiduciary position of a husband 
with respect to community property, the court said he 
must either ( 1) disclose fully information concerning 
the community property, or (2) "deal with her at arm's 
length and as he would with a stranger, all the while 
giving her the opportunity of independent advice as to 
her rights in the premises." The court went on to say: 
"Here the parties were dealing with one an-
other at arm's length-or at least the husband 
gave the wife every opportunity to deal at arm's 
length-when the settlement agreement was ne-
gotiated. The wife had independent advice. The 
fact that it appears that she was eager to secure 
aN evada divorce and that therefore she did not 
obtain, or have her counsel obtain, a complete 
listing of the properties of the parties is not 
chargeable to the husband. * * *" 
15 
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In McCarter et al. v. Zeller~ 35 Cal. App. 593, 170 
Pac. 636, although a fiduciary relationship was not in-
volved, reliance was. The court said: 
"Furthermore it affirmatively appears that 
the plaintiff did not rely upon any representa-
tions of the defendant. The record shows that 
Mrs. McCarter, before making the agreement in 
suit, sought the advice of an attorney and acted 
throughout the transaction on his advice." 
In Podlasky v. Price et al.~ 87 Cal. App.2d 151, 
196 P .2d 608, plaintiff claimed a right to rescind an 
agreement because of the fraud of the defendant. The 
court said: 
"Since the respondent employed both a veteran 
broker and a seasoned lawyer who advised her 
throughout the negotiations for the compromise, 
she did not rely on anything told her by a ppel-
lants and therefore cannot enforce the rescission." 
Waddy v. Gri·mes~ 154 Va. 615, 153 S.E. 807, was 
a suit by heirs of an insane person, since deceased, to set 
aside a conveyance of land by the trustee-guardian to his 
own wife. A decree of the lower court setting aside the 
conveyance was reversed by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia which said: 
"Where the trustee deals directly with the 
cestui trust, the transaction is not ipso facto 
voidable at the election of the cestui trust; but 
only prima facie presumed to be invalid, which 
presumption may be rebutted. 
"As is said in /(err on Fraud and Mistake at 
page 151: 'this rule does not, however go to the 
16 
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leng·t h of a voiding all transactions between par-
ties standing in fiduciary relation, and those to 
whmn thev stand in such relation. All that the 
court of ~quity requires is, that the confidence 
which has been reposed be not betrayed .. A. trans-
action between them will be supported, if it can 
be shown to the satisfaction of the court that the 
parties wereJ notwithstanding the relationJ sub-
stan tiall.tJ at arm's length and on eq1tal footingJ 
and that nothinrJ has happened 1.chich might not 
ha·vc happened had no such relation existed 
* * * ' " (Emphasis added). 
One recent California Supreme Court case did set 
aside a stipulated property settlement agreement even 
though both parties were represented by counsel. It is 
rail'. Bank of A1nerica National Trust and Savings 
.. ·1ssuciation, 56 Cal.2d 329, 364 P.2d 247, wherein the 
court distinguished the facts from those in Collins v. 
Collin~, 48 Cal.2d 325, 309 P.2d 420, supra, on the 
ground that the negotiations for the property settlement 
agreement in V ai were not in fact at arm's length, the 
husband having claimed to be too ill to face a contested 
lawsuit. The court said: 
"Plaintiff in the instant case discontinued the 
adversary proceedings commenced by her at the 
request of defendant who offered to supply full 
and complete information concerning the prop-
erty all of which was conceded to be community 
and who further stated that he was willing to 
negotiate a fair and equitable settlement. It 
would seem that plaintiff chose not to tenninate 
the fiduciary relationship nor to deal at arm's 
length, but instead to take the defendant's offer 
at face value. She signed the agreement believing 
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that she was fully and accurately informed as to 
the V ai community financial position." 
But the Vai case does not help Vera, who dealt with 
Lucy at arm's length throughout, and who, as far as the 
record shows, never believed that she had been "fully 
and accurately informed" as to all of Dr. Callister's con-
versations with his second wife. 
CONCLUSION 
It was clear from respondent's deposition, and it is 
clear from her brief, that the fraud claimed does not 
fit within any classification used by the courts. It isn't 
that Lucy misled Vera, but that Lucy didn~t help her 
and her attorney win the case. In her brief she says: 
"Vera compromised her claim for $4,000.00 
because she had little evidence to establish the 
doctor's fraudulent intent" (page 2). 
" * * * A case without an outright admission 
by Dr. Callister of his fraudulent intent would 
be a weaker case than one based upon such an 
admission. 'r era was, therefore, harmed by con-
cealment of such statement because the weak-
ness of a case induces its settlement for a small 
amount" (page 8). 
"Lucy had a duty of full disclosure when Y era 
asserted her claim, which duty continued after 
Lucy denied the claim and suit was brought 
against her" (page 9). 
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"The test of reliance in a case of concealment 
is whether or not \""era would have acted differ-
ently had their been a disclosure" (page 13). 
"Vera's counsel * * * would not have advised 
compromising Y era's claim had Lucy disclosed 
facts known to her" (page 14). 
On the basis of the pleadings and the depositions 
of \,.era T. Callister and James W. Beless, Jr., a trial 
court would have to conclude that the settlement was not 
mnde because of any belief on the part of the litigant 
and her lawyer that their opponent had made a full and 
fair disclosure of everything she knew, but on a belief 
that they would have a difficult time winning the law-
suit. Moreover, the Inatter concerning which Vera claims 
she had a right to informatio~~directly involved in the 
previous action; and in deciding whether or not to settle, 
Vera 1nade her own investigation and relied upon the 
advice of competent and experienced counsel. We sub-
mit that on this state of facts a trier of the fact could 
not find the necessary grounds for setting aside the judg-
ment and Lucy is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
On the other hand, if this court does not agree with 
our analysis of the precedents on fraud and non-disclos-
ure. Vera is nevertheless not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The statement by respondent's counsel 
at page 24 of her brief that a summary judgment is 
proper because "a trial court would be considering no 
facts other than those before Judge Ellett," is wrong. 
This court and the federal courts have held time and 
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again that the question to be decided on a motion for 
sunilllary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue 
as to a material fact. If there is, the matter must be tried 
by a court or a jury as a fact issue and not made the 
basis of a ruling as a matter of law that one party or 
another should prevail. 
c)P. 
The issue if the credibility of the deponents is pres-
ent in the instant case, and Vera has the burden of 
establishing the elements of fraud by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Most of the elements are within her 
own knowledge. As said by Judge Frank of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Arn-
stein v. Porter~ 154 F.2d 464, 470-471: 
"We agree that there are cases in which a trial 
would be farcical * * * but where, as here credi-
bility, including that of the defendant, is crucial, 
summary judgment becomes improper and a trial 
indispensible. It will not do, in such a case, to 
say that, since the plaintiff, in the matter pre-
sented in his affidavits, has offered nothing which 
discredits the honesty of the defendant, the 
latter's deposition must be accepted as true. 'Ve 
think that Rule 56 was not designed thus to fore-
close plaintiff's privilege of examining defend-
ant at a trial, especially as to matters peculiarly 
within the defendant's knowledge." 
The above and other cases are analyzed by Profes-
sor Moore in 6 IJ-foore~s Federal Practice par. 65.15, 
pages 2101 et seq. Professor Moore and the cases point 
out that the motion for a summary judgment is similar 
to a motion for a directed verdict. In order for the mov-
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ing party to prevail it n1ust be established that the fact-
tinder, on the basis ot' the facts presented, could not 
return a verdict for the other party. 
If respondent prevails in this action and the case 
is set down for trial again on the fraudulent conveyance 
issue and defendant should prevail, respondent would 
thereafter be able to re-open the judgment again if she 
found that there had been, at another time and place, 
another statement by Dr. Callister to Lucy (or to some-
one else if Lucy had knowledge about it) which might 
have assisted Vera in winning the lawsuit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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